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Essay
FRIENDLY, J., DISSENTING
MICHAEL BOUDIN†
American legal culture takes the dissent for granted as a natural
companion to the majority decision of the court, but this is a
parochial view. In early years, the British tradition was divided, with
the Privy Council barring and the House of Lords permitting the
1
publication of dissents; even today, some Continental countries
2
disallow them. In the United States, Chief Justice Marshall did what
3
he could to press for unanimous opinions. And years later, in 1924, a
judicial-ethics canon of the American Bar Association decried
4
dissents as tending to undermine faith in the courts.
Yet dissents have a capacity to reveal the views of an individual
judge in ways that panel decisions do not. Writing only for himself,
the dissenting judge does not need to compromise with anyone, can
employ a more personal voice, and can focus on issues of special
importance to him. Judge Henry Friendly is reckoned one of the
greatest federal judges to sit on the federal appellate bench in the
twentieth century, with no circuit court peer other than Judge

Copyright © 2012 by Michael Boudin.
† Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit. This Essay, in a slightly more
condensed version, was delivered as the McCorkle Lecture at the University of Virginia School
of Law in February 2011. Thanks are due to my then-law clerks, Jacob Heller, Joanna Huey,
Matthew Guarnieri, and Jonathan Bressler, and to my friends Judge Pierre Leval, Judge
Richard Posner, and Professor John Deutch, who each read an earlier draft of this Essay.
1. Michael Kirby, Judicial Dissent—Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, 123 L.Q.
REV. 379, 385–86 (2007).
2. Id. at 382.
3. M. Todd Henderson, From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of
Dissent, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 283, 311–24 (discussing Chief Justice Marshall’s success in
instituting the unanimous opinion); Charles F. Hobson, Defining the Office: John Marshall as
Chief Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 1421, 1442–44 (2006) (explaining that Chief Justice Marshall
“deliberately departed from the traditional mode of seriatim opinions” and that “[o]nce firmly
established, the single majority opinion survived for the duration of the Marshall Court”).
4. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 19 (1924) (asserting that “[e]xcept in case of
conscientious difference of opinion on fundamental principle, dissenting opinions should be
discouraged in courts of last resort”).
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Learned Hand. Judge Friendly wrote many dissents, almost all fullscale opinions done with his customary skill and learning.
During his nearly twenty-seven years on the bench—from
September 1959 to March 1986—Judge Friendly wrote not only 800
or so published majority opinions for his own court but also 103
dissents and 88 opinions that were either concurrences or partial
5
dissents. All of these separate opinions may be fairly treated as
dissents to some degree. Even when an opinion began with the phrase
“Friendly, J., concurring,” and even when Judge Friendly joined in
the panel’s judgment, his rationale usually differed from the
majority’s. A different rationale matters, of course, because it often
points to a different result on somewhat different facts.
Thus, in substance, Judge Friendly took a position that diverged
from the panel majority almost 200 times. This number may seem
modest as a percentage of the 2800 or so panel decisions in which he
participated during his career, but it is a significantly higher
6
percentage than the ones generated by most of his colleagues.
Because Judge Friendly’s separate opinions represent about 20
percent of his total opinions, they constitute a substantial body of
work that invites a critique.
Let me start by recalling Judge Friendly’s remarkable
background: his astounding A-double-plus average at Harvard Law
School—more than one full grade level above the then-rarely
conferred summa cum laude degree, which Judge Friendly also
received—his clerkship with Justice Brandeis, his association with
John Harlan—later the second Justice Harlan—at the Root Clark law
firm in New York, his cofounding in 1946 of the Cleary Gottlieb law
firm, and his service thereafter both as a founding partner at that firm
and as a full-time vice president and general counsel of Pan American

5. No authoritative count of Judge Friendly’s opinions exists, and assigning exact numbers
is complicated by the fact that although most of Judge Friendly’s opinions were written in
Second Circuit cases, the judge also served occasionally on three-judge district courts as well as
on the special rail-reorganization court established by Congress. The numbers set forth in the
text of this Essay are derived from Westlaw searches that sought to identify Judge Friendly’s
majority opinions, concurrences, and dissents as a circuit judge.
6. According to Westlaw’s classifications, see infra Appendix, Tables 1–2, the percentage
of Judge Friendly’s cases in which he dissented—3.64 percent—was somewhat higher than for
most others who sat as active judges while Judge Friendly was in active service; and his
percentage of concurrences—3.11 percent—was appreciably higher than most others’. If one
combines both of these percentages, one will see that Judge Friendly wrote separately in a
higher percentage of cases than all but two judges in this group—Judges Walter Mansfield and
Paul Hays.
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World Airways. No legal audience needs to be reminded of Judge
Friendly’s heroic scholarship in books, articles, and book reviews, all
8
written in his “spare” time.
As for Judge Friendly’s judicial career, the judge joined the
Second Circuit in 1959, when the famous bench manned by the two
Judge Hands—Learned and Augustus—as well as Judges Thomas
Swan, Charles Clark, and Jerome Frank had almost completely
disbanded. Judge Friendly did overlap with Judge Learned Hand, but
only briefly. The Second Circuit in 1959 was beginning to grow,
however, and over the course of his tenure, Judge Friendly had
seventeen different colleagues. Many of his colleagues were very able
figures, and the mention of two among them—Judges Ralph Winter
and James Oakes—serves to underscore that Judge Friendly fell in
the middle of the liberal-conservative spectrum, insofar as that
spectrum can be adapted to describe judicial attitudes.
So it may be worth considering why Judge Friendly, a moderate
figure and the acknowledged intellectual star of his court, failed so
many times to win a second vote for his position. But something must
first be said about other important matters: Judge Friendly’s
approach to legal issues, the style and substance of his dissents, and
what observers can learn from those dissents about the judge’s own
priorities with respect to the issues most worth the trouble of a
separate opinion. Finally, one should ask about his influence as a
judge and a dissenter and about the role that dissents play in the
judicial process.
All of Judge Friendly’s opinions, whether for panels or for the
judge himself, flowed from a common conception about judging.
Given his education and his experience, Judge Friendly had no
illusion that judicial decisions are the impersonal voice of the oracle

7. See THE YALE BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LAW 208–09 (Roger K.
Newman ed., 2009) (providing biographical information about Judge Friendly’s academic and
professional accomplishments); Michael Boudin, Judge Henry Friendly and the Craft of Judging,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 8 (2010) [hereinafter Boudin, Craft of Judging] (“What can be gleaned of
[Judge Friendly’s] work as general counsel of Pan American World Airways during its heyday
confirms that business lawyering was at least part of his repertoire. In fact, he served as well as
vice president of the company and as a member of its board of directors.”); Michael Boudin,
Judge Henry Friendly and the Mirror of Constitutional Law, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 975, 977–78
(2007) [hereinafter Boudin, Mirror] (“At Harvard Law School, . . . Friendly became a
legend. . . . Friendly was president of the Harvard Law Review and ranked first in his class.”).
8. Boudin, Mirror, supra note 7, at 976 n.2 (listing a sample of Judge Friendly’s major
works). A list on Westlaw of Judge Friendly’s articles, book reviews, and lectures includes more
than thirty entries and is by no means complete.
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or that any given case yields only one permissible result, let alone
only a single possible explanation for that result. Although such
notions were the target of legal realists during Judge Friendly’s early
years, the judge’s own views were probably closer to those of the so9
called legal-process school than to those espoused by legal realism.
Yet Judge Friendly did not fit neatly into any camp of legal
philosophy or even find the subject of legal philosophy to be one of
any special interest.
A common view of law, probably representing the way most
judges in the twenty-first century think they do their job, is this: that
judging is an endeavor by which certain accepted materials, such as
statutes and decisions, will, when subjected to an accepted set of
techniques—including textual study, inquiry into the underlying
policy, and reasoning by analogy—point toward answers or, in closer
cases, will at least inform and constrain choice. Under a more extreme
“formalist” view—the view against which the realists reacted—judges
think that rules determine everything, that a right answer necessarily
exists for every legal problem, and that only bias or lack of
competence can explain conflicts.
The legal-process school sharply differs from this formalist view
in various ways—for example, by recognizing that case law has
evolved in accordance with social needs and by giving special
attention to institutional competence. Nevertheless, the legal-process
school insists that “reasoned elaboration” of the grounds of decision
10
remains crucial to providing justification, continuity, and guidance.

9. Legal realism refers to a set of perspectives on judicial decisionmaking that stress the
study of the results reached by judges and those judges’ perceived underlying motivations,
rather than the formal explanations provided in their opinions. Its best known exponents, who
differed among themselves in their emphases and interests, thrived in the 1920s, ’30s, and ’40s.
See generally G. Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and
Social Change in Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 VA. L. REV. 999 (1972) (describing “the
displacement of [sociological jurisprudence] by [realism] in the first three decades of the
twentieth century”).
10. See William W. Fisher, III, Legal Theory and Legal Education, 1920–2000, in 3
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LAW IN AMERICA: THE TWENTIETH CENTURY AND AFTER (1920–),
at 34, 41 (Michael Grossberg & Christopher Tomlins eds., 2008) (“[Reasoned elaboration]
encompassed at least three, related guidelines. . . . [First,] a judge must assume a posture of
intellectual disinterestedness . . . . Second, . . . judges should consult with their colleagues before
coming to conclusions. . . . Finally, judges must in their opinions explain their reasoning
thoroughly, both to provide effective guidance to future litigants and to enable constructive
criticism of their decisions.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); G. Edward White, The
Evolution of Reasoned Elaboration: Jurisprudential Criticism and Social Change, 59 VA. L. REV.
279, 291 (1973) (noting that “legal scholars of the 1950’s grew increasingly convinced of the
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Perhaps this perspective has a special hold on those judges—like
Judge Friendly—who are most gifted in deploying the materials and
techniques by which an explanation is provided.
Let me explore, then, the character of Judge Friendly’s dissents.
All of Judge Friendly’s opinions were formidable, but with respect to
the dissents in particular, the word “devastating” comes swiftly to
mind. The measured self-restraint of Judge Friendly’s former partner,
the second Justice Harlan—himself a regular dissenter on the Warren
Court during the same era—was rarely visible in Judge Friendly’s
own dissents. Rather, in Judge Friendly’s dissents, mildly biting
11
comments about the majority decision were common. Showing that
those comments stung, sometimes an acute concurring judge in the
majority—such as Judge Jon Newman—would be moved to respond
12
for himself and to offer a further defense of the majority’s position.
When Judge Friendly dissented, tone was the least of the panel’s
problems. Judge Friendly’s knowledge of common-law doctrine was
bolstered by his own background as a prize-winning history student at
Harvard College. Judge Friendly’s deft handling of statutory
construction was unmatched, and one of his major articles—
nominally about his own mentor Justice Felix Frankfurter—was on

importance of judicial rationalization” and describing “Reasoned Elaboration” as a summary of
“a new set of ideals and standards for judicial decision-making”).
11. See, e.g., Goodwin v. Oswald, 462 F.2d 1237, 1251 (2d Cir. 1972) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) (“This case is a classic example of what I have called ‘the domino method of
constitutional adjudication . . . , wherein every explanatory statement in a previous opinion is
made the basis for extension to a wholly different situation.’” (omission in original) (quoting
Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 929,
950 (1965))). Nor were counsel automatically exempt from a barb or two. See, e.g., id. at 1248
(“On this appeal we see The Legal Aid Society, a venerable organization long supported by
private charity and more recently also by large public grants, assuming the role of solicitors for a
prisoners’ union.”).
12. E.g., Dickerson v. Fogg, 692 F.2d 238, 247 (2d Cir. 1982) (Newman, J., concurring)
(“Judge Friendly’s dissent contends that the circumstances under which [the victim] identified
[the defendant] at the arraignment of [the defendant’s] cousin were not sufficiently suggestive to
warrant assessment of the reliability of the identification under the criteria set forth in [Neil v.
Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972)]. I share the dissent’s concern that the police should not be obliged
to act in a ‘wholly unnatural fashion,’ but I am satisfied that no such requirement has been
imposed by the decision of this case.” (citations omitted) (quoting Dickerson, 692 F.2d at 249
(Friendly, J., dissenting))); Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942, 958 (2d Cir. 1980) (Newman, J.,
concurring) (“Judge Friendly’s vigorous dissenting opinion concludes that the case law has
generally opposed estoppel of the Government, and that the substance-procedure distinction
cannot be maintained in this context. My review of the authorities persuades me that estoppel of
the Government enjoys considerable support and that the substance-procedure distinction
makes the doctrine especially appropriate in the circumstances of this case.”).
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13

that very subject. More broadly, Judge Friendly’s fertility of mind
could furnish arguments in quality and number well beyond those
offered by counsel.
Nor was anyone Judge Friendly’s equal in the close parsing of
case law. Consider this piece of vivisection in one dissent, directed at
the precedents relied on by the panel majority. The case, Mitchell v.
14
Cuomo, concerned a preliminary injunction granted by the district
court to prevent the closing of a prison and the consequent transfer of
15
its prisoners to another prison alleged to be already overcrowded.
The district court had granted the injunction on the ground that an
Eighth Amendment violation had been plausibly alleged, although
16
not yet proven. In upholding the preliminary injunction, the panel
majority invoked the support of a concurring opinion in the Supreme
17
Court’s Rhodes v. Chapman and a prior decision of the Second
18
Circuit, Lareau v. Manson. Judge Friendly, however, read the
majority opinion in Rhodes as warning federal judges to avoid
intruding into state prison administration unless clear-cut violations
of the Eighth Amendment were demonstrated and countered the
majority’s citations in this fashion:
We should look for guidance to the majority opinion in Rhodes,
representing the views of six justices, rather than, as the [panel]
majority here does, to the concurring opinion, which represents the
views of only three, or to our own opinion in Lareau v. Manson, [a]
portion of which relied on . . . [a Sixth Circuit decision] . . . that was
reversed by the Supreme Court only a fortnight after Lareau was
19
decided.

Along with Judge Friendly’s legal skill came an unusually
thorough command of the record. The judge began one separate
opinion on an ominous note: “Although the [panel] opinion’s
statement of facts is accurate as far as it goes, a somewhat fuller
20
narrative is needed to place the matter in proper setting.” Typically,
13. Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in FELIX
FRANKFURTER: THE JUDGE 30 (Wallace Mendelson ed., 1964).
14. Mitchell v. Cuomo, 748 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1984).
15. Id. at 805–06.
16. Id. at 806.
17. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
18. Lareau v. Manson, 651 F.2d 96 (2d Cir. 1981).
19. Mitchell, 748 F.2d at 808–09 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
20. Pearlstein v. Scudder & German, 429 F.2d 1136, 1145 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting).
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in such cases, Judge Friendly would move methodically on to mine
the record for further facts, to draw inferences that the majority had
overlooked, and to discredit witnesses whose testimony underpinned
the panel’s position.
One such instance was Friendly’s dissent in a case called Sea21
Land Service, Inc. v. Aetna Insurance Co. In that case, a ship that
22
had gone aground was being towed free by another vessel. In the
process, the tow line broke and the ship was thrown against the rocks
23
and damaged. Under admiralty law, a contribution by the cargo
owner to the repair costs, otherwise borne by the ship’s owner alone,
24
would ordinarily have been required. But the district judge had
denied such a recovery by the ship’s owner on the ground that the
same damage would probably have resulted even without the failed
25
tow. On appeal, the panel majority did a fairly persuasive job of
upholding the denial of contribution—persuasive, that is, until one
26
reads Judge Friendly’s dissent.
What Judge Friendly showed, moving from fact to law and back
to fact again, was that the portions of the district court’s findings on
which the panel majority relied were more ambiguous than they
initially appeared. The key findings—in Judge Friendly’s words—had
“the . . . elusive quality of seeming to say more than [they] really
27
[did].” And what Judge Friendly found, buried in those ambiguous
findings, was a subtle confusion by the district judge about the correct
legal standard to be applied. Judge Friendly’s summing up, terse but
elegant, went thusly:
In my view the difficulty here has arisen because of the district
court’s shift from the standard it enunciated at the end of the
trial, . . . [specifically, whether the rescue effort involving the
attempted tow increased the likelihood of the loss at issue,] to the
concept . . . [that contribution] would not lie if it was ‘more likely
than not that the . . . [loss would have occurred], regardless of
whether the tow had been attempted.’ Since we all agree that the

21. Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 545 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir. 1976); id. at 1318–20
(Friendly, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 1314–15 (majority opinion).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 1315.
25. Id. at 1316.
26. Id. at 1318–20 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 1319.
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former is the correct standard, I would reverse and remand for
28
explicit findings in regard to it.

Unraveled, Judge Friendly’s point was that the rescue effort—
conceded to have been a legitimate effort to avoid much more severe
damage—could have increased in some measure the risk of the lesser
damage that resulted when the tow rope broke. Even if the same
lesser damage would probably have occurred without the tow, any
significant increase in the risk of such damage was traceable to the
reasonable rescue effort undertaken on behalf of both the ship’s
owner and the cargo owner to avoid a feared greater damage. Given
admiralty law’s aim of encouraging such reasonable rescue efforts, a
finding on remand of significant increased risk ought to be enough to
require a contribution to cover the ensuing loss when the effort
miscarried.
Although Judge Friendly’s dissents always had such penetration,
the occasions for the judge’s separate opinions varied widely. Some
involved major questions of law and policy on which a dissenting
view, if held, had to be expressed. But, as further examples show,
Judge Friendly also on occasion wrote separately when the issue was
largely factual, when the result was right but the analysis wrong, or
when a party was being unfairly treated. His lightning speed in both
thought and expression made it comfortable for him to dissent
whenever he disagreed, and he disagreed fairly often.
This was so in part because Judge Friendly saw in his mind’s eye
more dimensions of a case than do most judges. In addition to
possessing great analytical skills and a memory stocked with doctrine,
citations, and legal history, Judge Friendly—like a great chess
player—could foresee the remote dangers of a holding or distinction
proposed by the majority. Given all these capabilities, that he differed
from other judges is no wonder. And, having arrived at a “better”
answer, he did not hesitate to express it. Judge Friendly listened
carefully, even to young law clerks, but he made up his mind quickly
and decisively and had no false modesty.
Looking at four recurring themes in Judge Friendly’s separate
opinions, one can perhaps learn something more about the judge’s
priorities. These themes gave his dissents an energy that may have
been more diffused even in a majority opinion by Judge Friendly
himself that covered the same terrain. Put differently, when a judge is

28. Id. at 1320 (quoting id. at 1316 (majority opinion)).
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writing a panel opinion covering the full range of issues presented,
even strongly held preferences may appear to be just part of the
landscape. Judge Friendly’s dissents sometimes reveal emphases that
are less obvious in his opinions for the court.
First, despite Judge Friendly’s criticism of various ventures of the
Warren Court into criminal-law reform—for example, its invention of
29
new exclusionary rules and its drastic expansion of habeas corpus —
an abiding concern with fairness permeated Judge Friendly’s
decisions in criminal cases: in his attention to the possible innocence
of a defendant, in his insistence on government disclosure of
exculpatory evidence and on the defendant’s right to effective cross
examination, and in his blunt censuring of his own court whenever it
30
failed to give a party a fair chance to make out a case.
Regularly, Judge Friendly found flaws in convictions that did not
trouble his other colleagues. Here is a typical example: In United
31
States v. Ross, the defendant had been convicted in a federal district
court on a single count of simple possession of one-eightieth of an

29. E.g., Friendly, supra note 11, at 936 (“It is not obvious to me why determining which of
the interests protected by the Bill of Rights against the nation shall also be protected against the
states, or holding that the amendments mean something hardly suggested by their text, are
permissible objective judgments . . . . To say as the Court recently did, ‘the Self-Incrimination
Clause of the Fifth Amendment which we made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth,’
sounds pretty subjective to me.” (footnote omitted) (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609,
611 (1965))); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attacks on Criminal
Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 145 (1970) (asserting that the Court’s willingness to allow
collateral attacks that are unsupported by proof of innocence would make “[t]he proverbial man
from Mars . . . surely think we must consider our system of criminal justice terribly bad”).
30. E.g., United States v. Rush, 666 F.2d 10, 13–16 (2d Cir. 1981) (Friendly, J., dissenting)
(“In my view affirmance of this conviction [for conspiracy to import marijuana into the United
States] is not a proper exercise of the power, conferred upon [this court] . . . , to ‘require such
further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 2106 (1976))); United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 627–29 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the majority had failed to appreciate the necessity of
“maintain[ing] . . . prosecutorial candor,” in light of the central role of the grand jury in securing
basic liberties, and asserting that when a prosecutor fails to provide candid responses to a grand
jury’s questions, a “substantial possibility” that the grand jury would not have indicted had they
been given the requested information “is all that is needed to warrant . . . quashing the
indictment”); United States v. Capanegro, 576 F.2d 973, 983 (2d Cir. 1978) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting) (“The understandable desire that [the defendant] should not escape criminal
punishment should not lead us to extend the statute beyond what Congress directed.”); United
States v. Frattini, 501 F.2d 1234, 1238 (2d Cir. 1974) (Friendly, J., dissenting) (“[R]eversal of
[the defendant’s] conviction is necessary in justice not only to him but [also to his
codefendant]. . . . This is the rare narcotics case where the defendants may be innocent. There
must be a new trial . . . .”).
31. United States v. Ross, 719 F.2d 615 (2d Cir. 1983).
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ounce of cocaine—ordinary cocaine, not crack. The drug had been
found in a search of the defendant’s apartment conducted by agents
of the Internal Revenue Service who were investigating tax offenses
that had allegedly been committed by the defendant’s restaurant
33
business. The majority of the appeals court panel, joined by Judge
Friendly, remanded for a new trial on a misinstruction issue, but
Judge Friendly dissented from the court’s refusal to require a hearing
34
on the defendant’s selective-prosecution claim.
Judge Friendly’s dissent described the dubious conduct of and
threats by the prosecutors aimed at securing the defendant’s aid in
35
snaring his drug suppliers. Full cooperation, the prosecutor had
indicated, would lead to the dropping of all charges and the
defendant’s entry into the Federal Witness Protection Program; lack
of cooperation, the defendant said he had been warned, would result
in his being charged separately on each and every possible tax and
36
drug count available. This was too much for Judge Friendly, who,
asking only for a hearing on the disputed factual allegations, wrote in
part,
I recognize that the ability to offer leniency in return for
cooperation is an indispensable tool of law enforcement. I also
appreciate the undesirability of sanctioning a new defense unrelated
to the merits that might require extensive pretrial proceedings. But I
would want to think long and hard before deciding that selective
prosecution, initiated by information [without the protection of a
grand jury], for a trivial offense not generally prosecuted, following
conduct such as [defendant] and his counsel allege, did not go
37
beyond constitutional bounds . . . .

Second among the recurring themes was that of relative
competency—of examiner versus agency, trier of fact versus
reviewing court, and court versus legislature, executive branch, or
commission. “I fear,” Judge Friendly wrote in one instance, “[that]
this is another case . . . where appellate judges are whetting their
32. Id. at 616.
33. Id. at 617.
34. Id. at 622 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 622–23.
37. Id. at 623. Judge Friendly added, “The majority’s phrases, ‘declined to aid’ and ‘failure
to cooperate,’ are hardly adequate to describe the kind of assistance that would require
participation in the Federal Witness Protection Program.” Id. (quoting id. at 620 (majority
opinion)).
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appetite for dealing with facts rather than leaving these to the district
38
judge who saw and heard the witnesses.” That measured modesty,
reaching back to Professor James Bradley Thayer in one realm and to
Justice Frankfurter in others, was common in Judge Friendly’s
opinions, whether for the court or for the judge himself. Again and
again, Judge Friendly’s position and posture recalled Goethe’s
39
observation: “None proves a master but by limitation.”
Running through all that Judge Friendly wrote was yet another
thread, one that owed something to his temperament and much to his
years in law practice: attention to the practical. Whether assessing
substantive law, an evidentiary error, or a remedy on remand, Judge
Friendly thought that the judgment of courts should be anchored in
real-world conditions and should aim at getting the world’s work
done. If Justice Jackson was the patron saint of this church, then
Judge Friendly was a devout disciple.
Consider as an example Judge Friendly’s dissent in Hansen v.
40
Harris. At the time that case was being decided, the Social Security
regulations required a written application for benefits and allowed
claims for periods preceding the written application to go back only
41
one year. In Hansen, a divorced widow had applied for and received
benefits for the future and for one year prior to her application, but
she sought benefits also for earlier years that were seemingly
42
precluded by the one-year limitation period. She argued that when
she had inquired earlier about eligibility, the agency’s representative
had misled her into not filing an application by saying that she was
ineligible because she was divorced from her insured ex-husband. In
fact, as she later discovered, her ex-husband’s death had made her
43
eligible for mothers’ benefits notwithstanding the divorce.

38. Chem. Transporter Inc. v. Reading Co., 426 F.2d 436, 439 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J.,
dissenting); see also N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Dev. Auth., 700 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir. 1983)
(Friendly, J., dissenting) (“Judge Carter was in a far better position than we are to determine
whether [the defendant’s] counsel consented to an order requiring discontinuance of the New
York action. He had the ‘feel of the case which no appellate printed transcript can impart.’”
(quoting Cone v. W. Va. Pulp & Paper Co., 330 U.S. 212, 216 (1947))).
39. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, Nature and Art, in SELECTED POEMS 165
(Christopher Middleton ed., Michael Hamburger trans., 1983).
40. Hansen v. Harris, 619 F.2d 942 (2d Cir. 1980), rev’d sub nom. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450
U.S. 785 (1981); id. at 949–58 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 947 (majority opinion).
42. Id. at 944, 946.
43. Id. at 944.
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The Second Circuit majority found no deliberate
misrepresentation by the agent, as the widow had disclosed her
divorce orally to the agent but had not revealed to the agent her ex44
husband’s death. But the panel still held the agency estopped from
denying benefits for the period seemingly excluded by the one-year
45
limitation period. The writing judge’s theory was that an internal
agency guideline had directed agents to advise applicants of the
benefits of a written filing, even in doubtful situations, and that agents
had been told not to discourage filings even when an applicant was
46
likely ineligible. The widow recounted her alleged conversation with
47
the agent; the agent could not remember. Writing in dissent from the
result and from the opinion’s author’s reliance on the guidelines to
overcome the regulation, Judge Friendly observed,
By dispensing with compliance with an admittedly valid
regulation which requires a written application on the appropriate
form for a wide variety of social security benefits, the majority opens
the door of the federal fisc not simply to [the widow], whom we at
least know to have visited the HEW office and said something, but
to thousands who merely will make a detailed claim that they have
done so and whom[, without a writing,] there is no effective means
of rebutting. Millions of dollars will have to be expended simply to
ascertain whether conditions of eligibility claimed in a subsequent
48
written application existed at the time of the alleged oral one.

And, in the same case, Judge Friendly pointed to another
practical anomaly in the panel’s rationale:
Clearly it is in the public interest for an agency with over 80,000
employees, making more than 1,250,000 disability determinations
alone a year, . . . to issue housekeeping instructions to its employees
in the interest of uniform, fair and efficient administration. But it is
perplexing why an agency that issues such instructions should be
held to a higher legal standard of dealing with its clients than one
49
that does not.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id. at 947–49.
Id. at 948.
Id. at 947–48.
Id. at 944–45.
Id. at 949 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Id. at 956.
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Not many such dissents bring immediate vindication, but in this
case, the Supreme Court reversed the panel decision in a per curiam
50
decision, saying, “We agree with the dissent.”
Judge Friendly identified strongly with the judicial enterprise.
His intellect and interests cast him as a great scholar; his
temperament and drive, as a success in law practice; and his
imagination and literary flair, as a natural writer. But Judge Friendly’s
combination of talents—each one possessed to an unusual degree—
did not fit him perfectly into the pigeonhole of any of these vocations.
Judging, to which he turned with relief after hard years in private
practice, drew on all of his gifts. In return, he cared greatly about the
court system and the quality and consequences of its product.
A fourth theme in Judge Friendly’s separate opinions was
attention to further proceedings after the decision. Appellate judges,
having spent their efforts deciding whether further proceedings are
required in the case at hand, sometimes fail to consider carefully just
what should happen in the lower court once a remand is agreed to be
necessary. Yet in framing a remand, an appeals court enjoys unusual
statutory discretion, and Judge Friendly was always attentive to this
51
next stage. Again, this attention reflected not only his capacity for
the practical but also his ability to see further down the road than
other judges could see.
A good example is furnished by Judge Friendly’s dissent in New
52
York Life Insurance Co. v. Connecticut Development Authority. In
that case, an insurance company had brought an interpleader action
to decide conflicting claims to the cash surrender value of a policy it
53
had issued. After two of the three potential claimants had disclaimed
any interest, the cash surrender value had been awarded by consent
54
to the third, who was the policyholder. The district court had then
enjoined all three claimants from bringing further proceedings against
the insurer in other courts and had also precluded several related tort

50. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788 (1981).
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (2006) (authorizing the appellate court to “direct the entry of such
appropriate judgment, decree, or order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be
just under the circumstances”).
52. N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Conn. Dev. Auth., 700 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1983); id. at 97–98
(Friendly, J., dissenting); see also Dickerson v. Fogg, 692 F.2d 238, 249 (2d Cir. 1982) (Friendly,
J., dissenting) (“The majority follows the district court in condemning [the arresting officers] for
not conforming to a code of conduct which defies human nature.”).
53. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 700 F.2d at 92.
54. Id. at 93.
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claims that had been brought by the policyholder against the insurer.
The district judge had understood the policyholder to consent to this
56
resolution; but, after obtaining his payment, the policyholder sought
to preserve the tort claims and appealed when the district court
57
refused to alter its injunction.
On appeal, the majority of the Second Circuit panel thought it
unclear whether the consent extended to barring the separate tort
58
claims and remanded for further proceedings. Judge Friendly
thought the district court had permissibly found consent and opposed
the remand on the merits. He then continued, writing that even if the
tort claims were to be reinstated, they were so clearly frivolous that
the remand itself—intended to clarify whether consent had been
given—would be a waste of time:
Beyond all this a remand is essentially futile. There was simply
nothing to support [the policyholder’s] contention that New York
Life had acted in bad faith in instituting an interpleader action with
knowledge that there were no adverse claims . . . . If Judge Carter [in
the district court on remand] should alter his conclusion as to
consent, which the majority wisely does not require, he would then
be obliged to face this issue of New York Life’s good faith and there
59
can be no reasonable doubt what he would find.

Three of the four concerns emphasized in Judge Friendly’s
dissents—fairness, relative competence, and practical effects—are
ones that some laymen, and even some judges, may view as extrinsic
to the application of legal rules. But Judge Friendly, like any sensible
judge, knew well how much open space exists in the law and
recognized the role that other social values play in deciding cases. In
truth, discerning the vector that is the composite of incommensurable
values is one of the unspoken skills in judging. When a panel author
saw matters more narrowly, a separate opinion from Judge Friendly
was more likely.
In his dissents, Judge Friendly rarely showed satisfaction in
seeing the light when other judges had not. If anything, his
disagreements were flavored with frustration. Admittedly, as his law
clerks learned, Judge Friendly’s own rapidity of thought made him a
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 94.
Id. at 93–94.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 96–97.
Id. at 98 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
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shade impatient when his helpers could not keep up. But the sharper
tone of his dissents had a different cause: that tone was the asperity of
a master of the craft who sees the job being ill done, whether through
an overbroad holding, a mishandling of the record or precedent, or an
unjust outcome.
Craftsmanship is far more than adornment. Craft skills—
naturally a centerpiece for the legal-process school—do guide judges
to better reasoning and better outcomes even if they do not always
dictate an answer. Whereas litigants and the public care more about
the result than the explanation, the explanation is the part of the
result that governs future cases. Conversely, the taint of a poorly
crafted decision—especially one that is overbroad in its
generalizations and detached from the circumstances of the case—
impairs the court’s reputation and threatens mischief in future cases.
A balanced ticket of unhappy examples, more than a few from past
Supreme Court decisions, would be easy to adduce.
If craft is so important and if Judge Friendly was so much its
master, why then was he, in almost two hundred cases, unable to
bring along his colleagues? Of course, he may have persuaded them
often enough. Only a file-by-file review of more than 2800 case
folders in the Harvard Law School collection—Judge Friendly’s court
papers that describe the decisions by the panels on which he served—
would tell an observer how often the judge won over others in
conference or in memoranda. One can persuade another judge to
alter language or occasionally even a result and yet leave no trace of
disagreement in the published opinion. And when Judge Friendly
concurred separately rather than dissented, the pressure on other
judges to adjust their positions would be less for judges primarily
concerned with the outcome.
Still, on a three-judge panel, Judge Friendly needed to detach
only one other judge from an unsound prospective opinion. Judge
Friendly was not only a legal genius but also one with moderate views
and, despite some sharpness in his separate opinions, a pleasant
business-like manner with his colleagues—a trait common enough
among those who have succeeded in law practice. True, great
judges—like Justices Holmes, Brandeis, and the second Justice
Harlan—may become regular dissenters in constitutional cases simply
because they happen to be out of step with the recurring views of the
then-prevailing majority. But most of the time, Judge Friendly’s court
was dealing with a menu of largely technical cases that were highly
dependent on their facts rather than with great social issues.
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Judge Friendly had to fail sometimes. His colleagues were
confident men with leanings of their own, and Judge Amalya Kearse,
the only woman on the court during Judge Friendly’s tenure, was no
less confident than her brethren. Judge Friendly might have found it
doubly hard to reach a colleague in the panel majority who relied
more heavily on gut instinct than on analysis or precedent—this mix
varies considerably from judge to judge—or who had a strong
allegiance to the panel opinion’s author, or who lacked the energy to
reexamine an initial vote. And Judge Friendly might have been in the
“political” middle of the average panel but, on a particular panel, to
the judicial right or left of the other two judges. This kind of
imbalance can sometimes be checked by en bancs. But en bancs were
relatively rare in the Second Circuit—Judge Learned Hand
60
disapproved of them —so the panel usually had the last word.
As it happens, the political valence of the panel seems, from the
statistics, to have had little part in occasioning Judge Friendly’s
dissents. Among those judges from whom Judge Friendly dissented
61
most often were two liberals, two moderates, and a conservative;
those from whom he dissented at a rate closer to his average were
Judges Edward Lumbard, Sterry Waterman, and Paul Hays—another
group spread across the spectrum. And Judge Friendly sat with both
Judges Ralph Winter and Jon Newman—one conservative and the
other comparatively liberal—and dissented from none of their
opinions. Both judges were very smart and, whatever their
predispositions, were unlikely to make the kinds of errors so
provocative to Judge Friendly.
This brings me to the reasons for dissents and the balance of
advantages between the panel majority and the outlier judge. The
common aims of dissenters are familiar: to force changes in the
majority opinion and, if possible, to alter the reasoning or result; to
encourage en banc reconsideration or certiorari; to lay out an
alternative approach and to warn uncommitted courts elsewhere of
errors or dangers; to prompt legislative change; and to mark the

60. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 441–42 (2d ed.
2011) (stating that “[t]hroughout his life, Hand had nothing but scorn for the utility of en banc
hearings” and noting that Judge Hand had once said that he “would ‘never vote to convene’ an
en banc court”).
61. From judicial left to judicial right, these judges were Judges Thurgood Marshall and
James Oakes, Judges Irving Kaufman and John Smith, and Judge George Pratt; Judge Richard
Cardamone, from whose decisions Judge Friendly also dissented more often than average, is not
easy to label in this fashion. See infra Appendix, Table 2.
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precedent as a contested one. A dissent may have one or more of
these aims, but it is inherently an appeal to others.
When a panel majority writes ex cathedra, its decision controls
the outcome and determines the law, and no one else’s consent or
agreement is required. The dissent, by contrast, is openly advocating
a position and encouraging the panel and others to alter or overturn
the majority view. By criticizing the majority and advocating a
different course, the dissenter may forfeit the useful appearance of
judicial detachment. Instead of an air of Olympian detachment, the
dissenter may appear more of an advocate, although this result is
largely a matter of tone and can be controlled by the writer if he cares
to do so. In fact, a willingness to acknowledge points on the other side
often strengthens opinions, whether majority or dissent.
The dissenter, however, has advantages of his own: a fixed target
in the majority opinion, the analytical scalpel, the deployment of
precedent and record evidence ignored by the majority, and the
forecast of malign consequences. Few have been better at playing
offense than Judge Friendly, who, unlike Judge Learned Hand, had
spent decades as a litigator and whose calm concealed a toughness
honed in law practice. But Judge Friendly’s individual criticisms never
constituted the totality of his separate opinions. At the core of each
separate opinion lay a proposal to follow a different path—a subtler
reading of the precedents, an alternative assessment of the evidence,
or a variant gloss on a statute.
Let me say something in closing about the influence of Judge
Friendly’s separate opinions. The dissents labeled as great by legal
historians are almost entirely those of Supreme Court Justices,
written in great cases, usually—although not always—turning upon
provisions of the Constitution. Further, the dissents regarded as great
are often deemed so in part because they were prophetic and
ultimately prevailed in later cases. The roll-call is familiar—from
62
63
Justice Curtis in Dred Scott, to the first Justice Harlan in Plessy, to
64
65
Justice Holmes in Gitlow and Lochner, to Justice Brandeis in
66
67
Olmstead, to Justice Jackson in Korematsu.

62. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); id. at 564–633 (Curtis, J.,
dissenting).
63. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); id. at 552–64 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
64. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); id. at 672–73 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
65. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); id. at 74–76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
66. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928); id. at 471–88 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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When it comes to dissents, Judge Friendly—an intermediate
court judge with many mundane cases and no authority to write the
final word on the Constitution—could hardly belong in this company.
If he influenced the course of the law on important issues—and,
arguably, he did affect both criminal procedure and federal common
law, among other subjects—his articles may have mattered as much as
his opinions, and his panel decisions, which carried the imprimatur of
his court, had to have mattered more than his separate opinions.
Judge Friendly was widely cited by other judges both when he
wrote for a panel and, perhaps not surprisingly as his reputation grew,
when he wrote separately. By one count, his separate opinions—
adding concurrences and dissents together—have been cited more
often than those of Judge Learned Hand or of Judge Richard
68
Posner. But Judge Friendly’s panel opinions, unlike his separate
opinions, were controlling in his own circuit and, on that account, may
also have carried extra weight in other circuits. Nevertheless, even his
panel opinions were at the mercy of time and events.
Ultimately, Judge Friendly’s most lasting influence as a judge is
as a model for appellate judging—for opinions combining rigor,
learning, mastery of the record and the law, insight, and balanced
judgment. But Judge Friendly’s dissents offer a narrower yet potent
lesson—one that brings me back to the benefits of dissenting
opinions. The lesson turns on the potential power of a unanimous
panel, lacking a dissenter, not only to decide a case but also to control
what the audience learns about the case, its underlying facts, and the
arguments made by counsel.
One judge has observed that in a unanimous decision, “the
69
victors in the case get to write its history.” Against this danger, the
dissent is, as Professor Henry Wigmore said of cross examination, an
70
“engine . . . for the discovery of truth.” For like cross examination,
the dissent supplies for comparison, side by side with the official

67. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); id. at 242–48 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
68. A Westlaw search in February 2011 revealed that Judge Friendly’s dissents have been
cited 227 times and his concurrences 385 times. By contrast, Judge Richard Posner’s
concurrences have been cited 272 times, and his dissents 237 times; Judge Learned Hand’s
concurrences and dissents have been cited around sixty times each. Of course, numbers change
over time, and any comparison necessarily ignores other obvious variables.
69. Robert G. Flanders, The Utility of Separate Judicial Opinions in Appellate Courts of
Last Resort: Why Dissents Are Valuable, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 401, 402 (1999).
70. 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367, at 32
(James H. Chadbourn ed., rev. ed. 1974).
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version given by the panel, both an adverse commentary and an
alternative version of the matter. The majority has cast its lot with
one side; the dissenter reminds the audience that the other side
almost always has arguments of its own worth considering.
The phrase “learning from one’s mistakes” embodies an insight
familiar to every child. Whereas Judge Friendly’s majority opinions
taught the judicial virtues, his dissents warned against the common
sins of appellate judging: distorting or ignoring precedent, misstating
the record, being imprecise in thought and impractical in judgment,
allowing unfair or unreasonable outcomes, and failing to respect the
limits of the judicial role. Over and over, Judge Friendly’s separate
opinions not only identified the substantive mistake in the panel’s
reasoning but also identified the underlying sin or sins that had led to
the error. And the sins were made vivid by Judge Friendly’s use of the
panel opinion to illustrate them.
These are lessons indeed for judges, and no one needs them
more. Overworked, holding positions of authority but largely
insulated from outside criticism, and faced with perplexing problems
that affect many lives, judges can fall easily into such sins. True, a
quarrel does get settled, whether rightly or wrongly, and this finality
is no small benefit. The principal obligation of courts is to decide so
that the parties can get on with their lives. But judges are paid to get
the result as right as human beings can manage, and lawyers know
when judges have failed. This failure, not dissent, is what weakens
confidence in the courts.
The high office of the dissent is to lean against and check a onesided narrative or faulty analysis, to prompt a second look by the
panel, and to warn other courts against perpetuating the panel’s
mistake. In Professor Paul Freund’s enchanting phrase, the dissent is
“the second blade of the shears, against which the cutting edge must
71
work, serving to make a finer and truer line.” If Judge Friendly was
prodigal in separate opinions, it is the law’s gain.

71. PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 55 (1968).
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APPENDIX
Table 1. Judge Friendly’s Rate of Dissenting and Concurring
Compared to Contemporary Second Circuit Judges
Judge

On
Panel

Dissenting
Opinions

Percentage of
Cases in Which
the Judge
Dissented

Concurring
Opinions

Percentage of
Cases in Which
the Judge
Concurred

Mansfield

1492

89

6.0

66

4.4

Moore

2614

146

5.6

69

2.6

Lumbard

4101

175

4.3

122

3.0

Oakes

4526

189

4.2

107

2.4

Friendly

2822

103

3.6

88

3.1

Timbers

1551

55

3.5

19

1.2

L. Hand

5638

177

3.1

87

1.5

Mulligan

890

28

3.1

16

1.8

Marshall

533

16

3.0

9

1.7

Kaufman

2340

53

2.3

52

2.2

Waterman

2523

53

2.1

78

3.1

Gurfein

567

8

1.4

10

1.8

Anderson

1159

15

1.3

17

1.5
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Table 2. Judge Friendly’s Dissents from Other Judges
Judge

Appointing
President

Opinions with
Judge Friendly
on the Panel

Judge Friendly
Dissents

Percentage of
Dissents from
This Judge

Curtin (DJ)

Johnson

2

2

100.0

Dooling (DJ)

Kennedy

2

1

50.0

Danaher (D.C. Cir.)

Eisenhower

4

2

50.0

Cardamone

Reagan

6

1

16.7

Medina

Truman

32

5

15.6

Pratt

Reagan

14

2

14.3

Marshall

Kennedy

35

5

14.3

Kaufman

Kennedy

82

11

13.4

Kearse

Carter

15

2

13.3

Mansfield

Nixon

40

5

12.5

Oakes

Nixon

50

6

12.0

Hand

Coolidge

9

1

11.1

Smith

Eisenhower

126

10

7.9

Van Graafeiland

Ford

13

1

7.7

Feinberg

Johnson

100

6

6.0

Anderson

Johnson

68

4

5.9

Mulligan

Nixon

36

2

5.6

Hays

Kennedy

108

6

5.6

Clark

Roosevelt

37

2

5.4

Moore

Eisenhower

137

7

5.1

Waterman

Eisenhower

131

6

4.6

Lumbard

Eisenhower

158

6

3.8

Meskill

Ford

40

1

2.5

Timbers

Nixon

41

1

2.4

Winter

Reagan

21

0

0.0

Swan

Coolidge

14

0

0.0

Pierce

Reagan

11

0

0.0

Newman

Carter

17

0

0.0

Gurfein

Nixon

26

0

0.0

